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Critical interdependent infrastructure networks such as water distribution, natural gas pipeline, 
electricity power, communication and transportation systems provide the essential necessities for 
societies and their utilization is the backbone of everyday processes such as production, health, 
convenience and many more. Often cascading dysfunctionality or disruption in these critical 
infrastructure networks triggers chain reactions of blackouts or blockages through the system of 
highly interconnected infrastructure networks and the inevitable collapse of surrounding societies. 
For the planning of restoration processes and resilience of these, social aspects and demographics 
should also be considered to assign and mitigate the possible social risks associated with these 
disruptions. Additionally, it is crucial to identify the most critical components of these networks 
which are the components that have the largest impact on the performance of both their and other 
networks that are operationally dependent. These critical components have the largest impact on 
society in terms of serving its needs so that its recovery can be completed in a timely manner after 
a disruption. This research studies the restoration planning of critical interdependent infrastructure 
networks after a possible disruptive event by mainly emphasizing on the vulnerability indices of 
interacting society. The methodology integrates (i) a resilience-driven multi-objective mixed-
integer programming formulation to schedule the restoration process of disrupted network 
components in each network, and (ii) a component importance measure that quantifies the impact 
of equitable restoration activities on components with (iii) an index of social vulnerability that is 
geographically distributed. An illustrative example of the proposed integrated model that focuses 
on studying the community resilience in Shelby County, TN, United States is also represented. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Motivation 
Modern societies heavily rely on the sustainability and proper performance of critical 
infrastructure networks. Two decades ago, the Report of the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection [1997] defined a critical infrastructure network as a “network of 
independent, mostly privately-owned, man-made systems and processes that function 
collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of essential goods 
and services. These critical infrastructure networks such as water distribution, electric power, 
natural gas, communication, and transportation systems are essential for providing the basic human 
needs of the societies and maintaining their quality of life. However, more recently Infrastructure 
Security Partnership [2011] emphasized the importance of forming physically interdependent 
infrastructure networks that are resilient against the disruptions that will eventually occur. They 
defined resilient infrastructure networks as the networks that should “prepare for, prevent, protect 
against, respond or mitigate any anticipated or unexpected significant threat or event” and that are 
able to “rapidly recover and reconstitute critical assets, operations, and services with minimum 
damage and disruption”. Additionally, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan [DHS 2013] 
focuses on the enhancement of risk and vulnerability due to the interdependencies among the 
infrastructure networks and the importance of addressing these issues through the planning and 
forming of infrastructure by stating that it is “essential to enhancing critical infrastructure security 
and resilience” against inevitable disruptions, perhaps with more frequency, due to natural 
disasters, malevolent attacks, and aging-driven failures. Hence, as it has been highlighted by the 
White House [2013], the planning phase of infrastructure networks is more targeted to maintain 
“secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructures”.  
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While measuring the vulnerability of infrastructure networks by either topological 
descriptors [Barabasi and Albert 1999, Holmgren 2006, Newman et al. 2006, Nagurney and Qiang 
2009] or by flow-based descriptors [Rocco et al. 2010, Ouyang 2014, LaRocca et al. 2014, 
Nicholson et al. 2016] has been a well-studied problem, the restoration of infrastructure networks 
has been an important area of study for the last decade, particularly from an optimization 
perspective. The stochastic integer program proposed by Xu et al. [2007] determines the schedule 
of inspection, damage assessment, and repair tasks that optimize the power network restoration. 
Yan and Shih [2009] proposed a multi-objective, mixed-integer programming method with the 
objective of minimizing the total time of repair and relief distribution after a disruption in a 
transportation network. Similarly, Matisziw et al. [2010] developed a multi-objective optimization 
model to maximize the total system flow while minimizing the system cost through the recovery 
of a communication system. The integer programming model by Nurre et al. [2012] considers the 
maximization of the cumulative weighted flow in the infrastructure networks by scheduling work 
crews to restore disrupted components. Aksu and Ozdamar [2014] proposed a dynamic path based 
mathematical model to maximize network accessibility by scheduling debris removal. Vugrin et 
al. [2014] developed a bi-level optimization model for network recovery, providing the recovery 
sequence that maximizes the total flow in a critical infrastructure network. The multi-objective 
optimization model developed by Kamamura et al. [2015] focuses on the recovery of 
transportation systems by maximizing the traffic recovery ratio and minimizing the number of 
switched transportation paths in each stage of a multi-stage restoration process. Finally, Fang et 
al. [2016] proposed a Monte Carlo simulation-based method to rank the disrupted components 
according to their impact on system resilience to order their recovery. In general, the previously 
proposed algorithms commonly cover the objective of maximizing the performance of 
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infrastructure networks, rebuilding the disrupted components and their overall functionality by 
assigning the disrupted components to work crews, and determining the order of restoration 
sequence in the aftermath of a disruption. However, we believe that integrating the existing 
infrastructure restoration studies with a social perspective could be important for communities 
considering societal needs and focusing on the social benefits of infrastructure restoration. Hence, 
in this study, we model the restoration scheduling of critical interdependent infrastructure networks 
from a community resilience perspective.  
As noted by Rinaldi et al. [2001], infrastructure networks do not exist and function on their 
own in an isolated environment. In fact, they often rely heavily on each other in various ways. The 
interdependency of infrastructure networks has been categorized into four groups [Rinaldi et al. 
2001]: (i) physical, where output from one infrastructure network serves as an input to another, 
(ii) cyber, where one network depends on the information transmitted from another, (iii) 
geographical, where two infrastructure networks can be affected by the same local disruptive 
event, and (iv) logical, for all other possible types of dependency. Figure 1 represents the 
interdependencies between different main infrastructure networks that exist in a modern-day 
society. In this study, we only focus on the physical interdependency between three major 
infrastructure networks, though the proposed approach is generalizable for considering other types 




Figure 1. Relationship between physical infrastructure and community networks (adapted 
from Barker et al. [2017]). 
Interdependencies among infrastructure networks become more frequent and complex due 
to the increasing trend of globalization and technological developments [Castells 1996, Graham 
2000, Graham 2000, Rinaldi et al. 2001]. Even though the interdependencies can improve the 
efficiency of network functionality, this type of complex coordination causes them to become more 
vulnerable to disruptions. As a result of the interdependency, a disruption in some components of 
one of the infrastructure networks could lead a dysfunctionality in the undisrupted components of 
other dependent networks and could result in a series of cascading failures among the whole 
infrastructure network system [Little 2002, Wallace et al. 2003, Buldyrev et al. 2010, Eusgeld et 
al. 2011]. Therefore, this high vulnerability of infrastructure networks against disruptions is a 
critical concern for decision makers where they should account for the interdependencies through 
the recovery planning to achieve a realistic performance analysis [Holden et al. 2013]. Moreover, 
scheduling the restoration processes separately for interdependent infrastructure networks without 
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considering their interdependencies could cause misutilization of resources, waste of time and 
funds, and even might trigger additional inoperability of distribution systems [Baidya and Sun 
2017]. However, functional connectivity among these critical infrastructures is not the only 
dependency that should be taken into account. The supply-demand relationship, thus an existence-
based dependency that exists within cyber-physical-social systems, is another challenging aspect 
that should be addressed in restoration scheduling models.    
  As infrastructure networks exist to enable the fundamental services that support the 
economic productivity, security, and quality of life of the community, interdependency among 
infrastructures is not the sole interdependency of interest in this study. Defined as the 
interconnected society that infrastructure networks support [Barker et al. 2017], we are also 
interested in community networks. The interdependency among these infrastructure and 
community networks is generally depicted in Figure 1. Among the planning documents by 
government agencies on resilience, there is a particular emphasis on the resilience of communities 
after a disruptive event. The National Academies of Science [2012] suggests “One way to reduce 
the impacts of disasters on the nation and its communities is to invest in enhancing resilience […].” 
The National Institute for Standards and Technology [2015] defines community resilience as “the 
ability of a community to prepare for anticipated hazards, adapt to changing conditions, and 
withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.” Community resilience is the ability of a 
community to successfully cope with disruptions from the economic, social, and environmental 
aspects, as well as to coordinate recovery activities [Rotmans et al. 2003, Resilience Alliance 
2009]. As such, communities contribute to the overall impact of a disruption and should be 
considered in modeling infrastructure restoration. 
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Considering the equity through the preparedness and recovery activities against disruptions 
is another critical humanitarian approach [Gralla et al. 2014, Huang et al. 2012]. Especially in 
disaster relief efforts and humanitarian supply chain management, social equity is addressed such 
that (i) the optimal distribution of relief goods or demanded commodities to the affected society 
ensures that an equitable amount of goods are provided to each portion of the community [Davis 
et al. 2013, Noyan et al. 2016] or (ii) the relief efforts and allocation of resources are reshaped 
based on the varying vulnerability, expectations, and social demographics of the different groups 
[Arnette and Zobel 2019, and Zolfaghari and Peyghaleh 2015].  
Different components in the infrastructure networks can have different impacts on its own 
network, as well as other interdependent infrastructure and community networks. For example, the 
outage of a particular electric power substation could adversely impact the entire power grid, the 
water and telecommunications networks that require electricity, and several populations, some of 
which could be vulnerable during times of disruption. As such, it is important to identify the critical 
components of the infrastructure networks to understand their impacts and to effectively plan for 
their restoration. The identification of critical components has been aided by component 
importance measures (CIMs), long studied in the reliability engineering literature. Particularly for 
networks, topology-driven CIMs rank components by average path length [Newman 2006] and 
network efficiency [Nagurney and Qiang 2009], while flow-driven CIMs have been developed for 
various vulnerability measures [Nicholson et al. 2016, Ouyang et al. 2014, Rocco et al. 2010]. 
Several importance measures have been developed to capture network resilience [Barker et al. 
2013, Whitson and Ramirez-Marquez 2009], including recoverability-driven CIMs identified by 
their optimal repair time and their role in reducing resilience [Fang et al. 2016]. Several CIMs have 
been developed for interdependent networks, including: (i) interdependent rank ordering, which 
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considers physical interdependency among and ranks each node separately for multiple importance 
criteria (i.e., network connectivity, flow transfer, network vulnerability, flow traversal), (ii) 
geographic valued worth, which ranks geographic locations by the disruption impact of that 
location over the multiple, geographically interdependent networks, (iii) a CIM that ranks 
components in interdependent networks according to their synergistic consequences over the total 
synergistic consequences for a specific failure set [Johansson and Hassel 2010], and (iv) a CIM 
that evaluates network components according to the drop in the network performance that is caused 
by their one-at-a-time disruption [Wang et al. 2013].  
This research studies the restoration of interdependent infrastructure networks from the 
perspective of community impact as measured by socio-economic and demographic information 
describing the affected communities and develops a resilience-driven CIM that combines (i) 
interdependent infrastructure network restoration with (ii) impact on the community that those 
infrastructure network components serve. The social vulnerability indices [Cutter et al. 2003] and 
population densities of the service areas are used to represent community impact, thus guiding the 
restoration process toward areas of potential community need. The primary objective of the 
interdependent infrastructure networks restoration study is to: (i) integrate a resilience-driven 
multi-objective mixed-integer programming formulation to schedule the restoration of disrupted 
components in each network, (ii) assign the restoration of these components to specific work 
crews, and (iii) prioritize them with social vulnerability indices and densities of the covered 
population in order to measure the expectations of the geographically surrounding community. For 
identifying the critical components of the interdependent infrastructure networks, this research 
considers (i) several dimensions of social vulnerability, driven by the Social Vulnerability Index 
[Cutter et al. 2003], (ii) ranking the components separately according to those dimensions then (iii) 
8 
 
aggregating them using a multi-criteria decision analysis technique. This proposed approach 
provides a new perspective on infrastructure network component importance that ties to social 
equity and community resilience. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the methodological 
background that the proposed approach is built upon is explained, in Chapter 3 the proposed 
mixed-integer multi-objective resilience-driven optimization model for interdependent 
infrastructure network restoration problem and the adopted component importance measure in the 
study is defined and in Chapter 4 the illustrative example of the proposed study is included over 
the critical infrastructure networks in Shelby County, TN. Finally, Chapter 5 is followed by the 












Chapter 2: Methodological Background 
In this chapter, the relevant methodological background on network resilience measures, 
independent infrastructure network recovery problems, social equity aspects, and social 
vulnerability indices are addressed. 
2.1 Modeling and Measuring Network Resilience 
Resilience is often considered to be the ability to withstand, adapt to, and recover from a 
disruption [Obama 2013]. While many generally agree on the definition [Haimes 2009, Aven 
2011, Ayyub 2011], a number of approaches to measure and model resilience have been proposed 
in the recent literature [Hosseini et al. 2016]. For example, Cimellaro et al. [2010] measured the 
resilience of a system as the normalized area underneath a function describing the performance of 
the system, while, Rosenkrantz et al. [2009] represented resilience as a function of topological 
measures, and Li and Lence [2007] quantified resilience as the probability of failure recovery.  
In this study, the resilience of a network is quantified by adopting the paradigm proposed 
by Henry and Ramirez-Marquez [2012]. Denoted as Я, the resilience of a network at time t is 
formulated as Я(𝑡|𝑒𝑗) = Recovery(𝑡)/Loss(𝑡d ), for disruptive event 𝑒
𝑗 and where  𝑡d < 𝑡 < 𝑡f 




Figure 2. Network performance representation, 𝝋(𝒕), across various stages of a disruptive 
event (adapted from Henry and Ramirez-Marquez et al. [2012]). 
As it is illustrated in Figure 2, the two primary dimensions of network resilience are 
vulnerability and recoverability [Henry and Ramirez-Marquez 2012, Barker et al. 2013], and their 
definitions in the literature as follow: Jönsson et al. [2008] defined vulnerability of a network as 
“the magnitude of damage in network performance due to a disruptive event” and Rose [2007] 
referred recoverability of a network as “the speed at which the network reaches to a desired 
performance level”. 
In a more detailed discussion, Figure 2 represents the three transition stages of the 
occurrence of a disruptive event in a system; before, during and after. The stage of network before 
the occurrence of a disruptive event, 𝑒𝑗, at time 𝑡e, is the original stable state, 𝑆0. The disrupted 
stage of the network where the maximum disruption occurs from time 𝑡e to time 𝑡d is represented 
as 𝑆d and this state continues until the restoration process begins at time 𝑡s. Finally, the recovered 
state of the network is denoted with 𝑆f and this is the state where the restoration process of the 
disrupted components are completed at time 𝑡f. Additionally, the performance of the network or 
the system is represented by φ(t) through the illustration which states the flow, connectivity, 
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unmet demand or delay through the three states. The network performance before the occurrence 
of a disruptive event is represented as φ(𝑡0), the performance through the disruption until the 
completeness of restoration process is stated as φ(𝑡d) which could be less than the original 
performance, φ(𝑡0), since the system is affected by the disruption and the connectivity, flow, or 
the utilization of the assets could be damaged. Finally, the desired level of network performance 
after the completion of the restoration process is represented as φ(𝑡f) where it does not have to be 
same with the performance at the original state φ(𝑡0), it could be less or more according to the 
network properties. 
2.2 Restoring Interdependent Infrastructure Networks 
Attention has recently been devoted to studying the optimal scheduling of restoration 
resources for interdependent infrastructure networks. Lee et al. [2007] proposed an interdependent 
layered network model using mixed-integer programming with the objective of minimizing the 
sum of costs associated with flow and slack through the time, where cost and available work crews 
for restoration were not accounted for. Gong et al. [2009] proposed an optimization model for the 
restoration of disrupted interdependent network components assuming that the predetermined due 
dates of these components as the upper-limit on the completion of the restoration process are 
known through the study. Their multi-objective restoration scheduling model was solved using 
Benders decomposition with the objective of minimizing the cost, tardiness, and makespan. 
Coffrin et al. [2012] proposed an integrated mixed-integer programming method to maximize the 
weighted sum of interdependent met demand through the recovery duration. Cavdaroglu et al. 
[2013] and Sharkey et al. [2015] proposed mixed-integer programming models to determine the 
set of disrupted components that should be restored and to assign them to available work crews 
with the objective of minimizing the sum of flow cost, slack cost, and the cost associated with the 
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restoration process (e.g., installation and assignment of disrupted components). Holden et al. 
[2013] studied an extended network-flow model at a local-scale of physically interdependent 
infrastructure networks to simulate their performance by providing a linear programming 
optimization model that minimized the total cost of production, commodity flow, storage, 
discharge, and slack demand. González et al. [2016] proposed the Interdependent Network Design 
Problem (INDP), which focuses on finding the optimal recovery strategy of a system of 
interdependent networks, while considering limited resources, possible savings due simultaneous 
repairs of co-located components, and other budget and operational constraints. Smith et al. [2017] 
proposed a game-theory-based model to study and optimize the recovery of system of 
interdependent networks when each network is separately managed by a different entity (or 
player). González et al. [2017] proposed a data-driven system identification approach that uses a 
linear operator (defined as the recovery operator) to depict the main damage and recovery 
dynamics of a system of interdependent networks, which later on can be used to efficiently 
generate quasi-optimal recovery strategies. Baidya and Sun [2017] formulated a mixed-integer 
linear programming approach to prioritize the restoration activities of disrupted components in the 
physically interdependent power and communications infrastructure networks with the objective 
of minimizing the number of energizing activities required through the restoration to ensure the 
operability of every node. Tootaghaj et al. [2017] proposed a two-phase recovery approach for 
physically interdependent power and communications network while assuming that the disruption 
occurred only in the power network. First, the formulation of a linear programming model for 
minimum flow cost assignment problem to avoid further failures in the system is completed. The 
objective of this model is finding the setting of the power flow which avoids further cascading. 
Then, the formulation of a mixed-integer programming for the recovery problem of these 
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interdependent infrastructure networks in order to provide the schedule of recovery for the 
disrupted components took place. The objective of this approach is to maximize the total amount 
of commodity delivered through both networks (i.e. electricity power) in the recovery duration. 
Zhang et al. [2018] proposed an optimization model to determine the allocation of available 
restoration resources (i.e., time and work crews) and the optimal budget associated with the 
restoration process after a specific disruption scenario for the physically interdependent 
infrastructure networks while the resilience of the system is enhanced. In the literature, even 
though the restoration scheduling of interdependent infrastructure networks has been examined 
both with network performance and resilience perspective in mind, accounting for the resilience 
of communities is the most important contribution of this work.    
In this research, a generic approach to account for community resilience in a multi-
objective optimization model (adopted from Almoghathawi et al. [2017]) is proposed. The model 
considers time availability and specific skill requirements in the work crews for the restoration of 
disrupted components (i.e., each network has been assigned with different work crews for the 
restoration process). The two objectives are (i) maximizing the resilience of studied interdependent 
infrastructure networks, and (ii) minimizing the costs associated with the disruption, resulting 
unsatisfied demand, and restoration. Discussed subsequently, the model proposed in this paper 
accounts for the social vulnerability and population densities associated with the disrupted 
components of the interdependent networks. 
2.3 Characterizing Social Vulnerability 
In defining network vulnerability in a holistic way, Mileti [1999] focused on the impacts 
of the surrounding environment vulnerabilities from three perspectives: (i) the physical 
environment, (ii) the constructed structures, and (iii) the served society. The first perspective deals 
14 
 
with the spatial characteristics of the setting of an infrastructure network and could be quantified 
with spatially-explicit information (i.e. location of the network components) [Mileti 1999] and the 
evacuation potential of the study region (in arterial miles/mi2) [NRC 2006]. The second 
perspective deals with the vulnerability of structures, such as which could be quantified the 
housing age [NRC 2006] and tree trimming frequency of the region [Guikema et al. 2006]. With 
regard to the third perspective, on understanding the vulnerability level of the served society, more 
human and community characteristics are considered. For example, in terms of the restoration 
resources some studies utilized the number of available resources (i.e., restoration work crews and 
equipment, physicians and emergency responders) in the region [Norris et al. 2008], the shelter 
capacity of the area [Tierney 2009], and the medical capacity of the considered location [Auf der 
Heide and Scanlon 2007], among others. Other studies have emphasized the importance of socio-
economic demographics to describe the vulnerability of the served society. For example, Norris et 
al. [2008] and Cutter et al. [2008] focused on racial and ethnic inequalities in communities, Norris 
et al. [2008] and Morrow [2002] focused on educational inequality, and Cutter et al. [2008] 
analyzed previous disaster experience.  
Social vulnerability is defined as the set of characteristics of an individual or a group in 
terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a hazard 
[Blaikie et al. 1994]. Many take a socio-economic approach to model social vulnerability, as such 
socio-economic measures that represent the inherent vulnerabilities of certain demographic groups 
where due to these different natures, the consequences of the same disruption over different 
communities would not be same [Cutter et al. 2003, Morrow 2002, Cutter et al. 2008, Tierney 
2009]. One such model is the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI). Cutter et al. [2003] developed 
the SoVI algorithm to identify the socially more vulnerable groups in society and formulate a final 
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aggregated index describing the cumulative effect of individual socioeconomic characteristics. In 
the SoVI algorithm, the 42 socio-economic characteristics are defined as social vulnerability 
variables as each one of them represent a different sub-group in the society. Also, these variables 
are grouped into eleven social vulnerability factors and they are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. The 11 factor groups that are identified by Cutter et al. [2003] to quantify the 
social vulnerability of a community. 
Age Occupation 
Density of the built environment Personal wealth 
Ethnicity (Hispanic) Race (African-American) 
Ethnicity (Native American) Race (Asian) 
Housing stock and tenancy Single-sector economic dependence 
Infrastructure dependence  
 
According to the definitions and percentages of these factors, these various properties 
either oppose or contribute to the community resilience measure of a region. By utilizing these 11 
factor groups of factors, Cutter et al. [2003] then developed a social vulnerability index algorithm 
to calculate the vulnerability of spatially explicit communities, suggesting that the utilization of 
available resources through the pre- and post-disruption stages may differ for each community.  
In this study, a reduced version of the SoVI algorithm, SoVI-Lite [Cutter et al. 2013, Evans 
et al. 2014], is utilized to measure the potential of community loss and possible community 
response in after a disruption. Thus, the SoVI-Lite algorithm is used here as a community resilience 




The SoVI-Lite algorithm calculates the social vulnerability index for a given community 
with the following three steps: (i) obtaining the percentage of the population in that community 
that belongs to the social group categorized by the 11 factors42 variables to define socio-economic 
vulnerabilities, then (ii) calculating the z-scores for each of the 11 factors 42 variables by using 
the overall mean and standard deviation per factor, and finally (iii) taking the sum of z-scores of 
all 11 factors 42 variables to account the total social vulnerability index of a specific region.  
2.4. Social Equity Aspect 
The concept of equity has been divided into two categories: (i) horizontal and (ii) vertical 
equity. Joseph et al. [2016] defined horizontal equity as the equal treatment of equals and vertical 
equity as unequal treatment of unequals. Horizontal equity could be expressed as each individual 
or group in the society being able to meet their needs since they have access to the same amount 
of resources separately. Vertical equity could be expressed as providing each individual or group 
in the society a varying amount of resources that is proportional with the level of their needs and 
vulnerabilities. 
For horizontal equity, Cai [2008] studied a water delivery system from fiscal, social, 
economic, and environmental aspects to identify the required policy and reforms that ensure equal 
access of water among communities at all levels. Yan and Shih [2009] optimized the scheduling 
of emergency railroad repair such that the relief of multiple commodities to each location is 
equalized. Cao et al. [2016] optimized humanitarian relief distribution in a service network where 
meeting demand is considered for three different granularity including regional and national 
priorities. 
For vertical equity, Thomopoulos et al. [2009] proposed a support tool to assist decision 
makers in differentiating their choice of equity perspectives and principles. Manaugh and El-
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Geneidy [2012] developed a transportation network methodology that allows accessibility and less 
travel time for the varying socio-economic groups. Ogryczak et al. [2014] conducted a survey 
study for fair optimization methodology that is applied to the interdependent communication 
networks where these equitable models provide an unequal amount of system service based on 
operations-dependent relations. Zolfgahri and Peyghaleh [2015] proposed a two-stage stochastic 
programming method for resource allocation for regional earthquake risk mitigation where the 
equity consideration led to variability in mitigation expenditures by geographic and structural 
vulnerability. Manaugh et al. [2015] evaluated the concept of equity and its integration into 
transportation network planning objectives and measures in terms of satisfying the various 
expectations of different social groups. Arnette and Zobel [2018] developed a risk-based 
optimization model to improve the disaster relief asset pre-positioning based on the varying 










Chapter 3: Proposed Methodology 
This developed research builds upon an initial multi-objective resilience-driven restoration 
optimization model proposed by Almoghathawi et al. [2017]. This mixed-integer program 
maximizes the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks while minimizing the total 
cost associated with the restoration process. As for the contribution of this work, we extend how 
resilience is quantified by introducing a version of the SoVI-Lite score to account for a community 
resilience perspective. Additionally, a third objective for the existing work is formulated to 
represent social equity among the community. This extended model is an integration of a social 
vulnerability perspective on the restoration of interdependent infrastructure networks to introduce 
a community resilience-based component importance measure that ranks the critical components 
of interdependent infrastructure networks based on various social vulnerability variables. 
3.1. Interdependent Infrastructure Network Restoration Model 
3.1.1. Notation and Assumptions 
In the multi-objective mixed-integer programming model that is extended for the 
interdependent infrastructure network restoration problem, the following assumptions hold: (i) 
there is no partial disruption in the nodes and links (hereafter, components) of the critical 
infrastructure networks through the disruption phase, (ii) there is no partial operability in the 
components of the critical infrastructure networks through the restoration phase, (iii) the required 
restoration duration differs for each component in the critical infrastructure networks, (iv) the 
amount of demand and supply is known for the nodes in the system, (v) the optimal amount of 
flow is known for each link in the system, (vi) the fixed unmet demand penalty cost (i.e., disruption 
cost) is assigned for each demand node in the networks, (vii) the varying restoration costs are 
assigned for each disrupted component in the networks, (viii) the varying unit flow cost that is 
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proportional with the length of the disrupted component is assigned to each link, (ix) the physical 
interdependency allows a component to be either fully operational or not operational based on the 
status of the components required for interdependency, and (x) known and fixed number of 
restoration crews are assigned to each network separately where each work crew can restore a 
single component at a given time through the restoration process. Most of these constraints which 
govern the component functionality, recoverability, disruption, and interdependency are loosen in 
the further studies so that they are represented by continuous states rather than binary stages.  
Set 𝐾 represents the set of infrastructure networks, and 𝑇 = {1, … , 𝜏} represents the set of 
available time periods for the restoration process. For each network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, the sets of nodes and 
links are represented by 𝑁𝑘 and 𝐿𝑘, respectively, where set of supply nodes and set of demand 
nodes are denoted by 𝑁𝑠
𝑘 ⊆ 𝑁𝑘 and 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 ⊆ 𝑁𝑘 respectively. The set of disrupted nodes are denoted 
by 𝑁′𝑘 and the set of disrupted links are represented by 𝐿′𝑘. The maximum amount of supply at 
node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑠
𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is denoted by 𝑏𝑖
𝑘, calculated as the maximum flow from node 𝑖 ∈
𝑁𝑠
𝑘 to all demand nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. The amount of unmet demand at node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 
in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 is represented with 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑘 . Thus, the total unsatisfied demand at all 
demand nodes in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 through the restoration process at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 is ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑖∈𝑁𝑑
𝑘 . The 
unmet demand at demand node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘  in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 after the disruptive event is denoted by 
𝑄𝑖
𝑘, and the equal weight of each network is represented by 𝜇𝑘 for network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, such that 
∑ 𝜇𝑘 = 1𝑘∈𝐾 .  
The cost of restoration of disrupted nodes and links in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 are represented as 
𝑓𝑛𝑖
𝑘 for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘  and 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑘  for (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘, respectively.  The unitary unsatisfied demand cost 
associated with node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 is represented with 𝑝𝑖
𝑘, while the unitary flow cost through link 
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(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿𝑘 is represented with 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑘 . The binary variable 𝑧𝑖
𝑘 is equal to 1 if node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 is restored 
and 0 otherwise. Likewise, binary variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑘  is equal to 1 if link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘 is restored and 0 
otherwise. The total flow through link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 is 
represented by non-negative variable 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 .  
The restoration duration for node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 and for link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘 are denoted by 𝑑𝑛𝑖
𝑘 and 
𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑘  that are proportional to the capacity of the nodes and length of the links in the networks, 
respectively. The flow capacity for link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is 𝑢𝑖𝑗
𝑘 . The binary variable 
𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑘  is equal to 1 if the node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘 is operational and 0 otherwise, and the binary variable 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘  is 
equal to 1 if the link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘 is operational and 0 otherwise in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇. 
The set of available work crews or resources for the restoration process of each network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is 
represented with 𝑅𝑘, where the resources are assigned specifically for each network in terms of 
the required skills and expertise. 𝛾𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑟 and 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘𝑟 represent the scheduling variables for node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘  
and link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 and at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, respectively. These variables are both 
equal to 1 if the restoration of the associated disrupted component is completed by work crew 
𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑘 at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 and 0 otherwise. Finally, the network interdependencies are represented by 
((𝑖, 𝑘), (𝑖,̅ ?̅?)) ∈ Ѱ, where node 𝑖̅ ∈ 𝑁?̅? in network ?̅? ∈ 𝐾 is physically dependent to node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘 
in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 in terms of functionality. 
3.1.2. Community Resilience Measures 
In this research, the social vulnerability index is introduced into the optimization model by 
defining a parameter 𝑆𝑜𝑉𝐼𝑖
𝑘, which represents an index between 0 (socially the least vulnerable) 
and 1 (socially the most vulnerable) for demand node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. The value of 
𝑆𝑜𝑉𝐼𝑖
𝑘 is calculated by the SoVI-Lite method separately for each demand node according to the 
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geographical region it represents. Furthermore, the obtained social vulnerability indices could be 
standardized to be scaled between 0 and 1 where 1 represents socially the most vulnerable 
community and 0 stands for socially the most resilient community. The standardization formula 
for the social vulnerability index of a specific community z, where 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 and 𝑋 is the set of all 
social vulnerability indices, can be seen in Eq.(1). By standardization, any negative social-
vulnerability scores would be avoided without changing the probability distribution and it would 
be integrated in the proposed optimization model without conflicting with the adopted resilience 
metric and total recovery cost formulation.  
𝑧 − min(𝑋)
max(𝑋) − min(𝑋)
, ∀ 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 (1) 
Moreover, to give relatively more emphasis on the regional areas that are assigned with 
higher social vulnerability indices (i.e., 0.7 and higher values of 𝑆𝑜𝑉𝐼𝑖
𝑘), this research introduces 
the exponential formulation of social vulnerability scores, which is represented as 𝑉𝑖
𝑘, as in Eq. 
(2). Hence, with this formulation we highly penalize the increases in the social vulnerability scores 
for more vulnerable areas. Thus, the penalty of an increase in the vulnerability level would be 
represented more drastically in the proposed method, since the relative importance of different 
social vulnerability scores would become exponential rather than linear ratios. The constant 𝑎 in 
Eq. (2) is chosen such a way that it would generate a reasonable emphasize on the higher social 




, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 , 𝑎 ∈ 𝑍+ (2) 
Additionally, the parameter 𝑃𝑖
𝑘 is introduced to indicate the population density of the 
geographical region in which the demand node is located to account for human occupancy levels 
in our resilience-driven objective. In addition to SoVI-driven measures of social vulnerability, the 
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size of the population being served by infrastructure demand nodes can also be considered as a 
perspective of community -resilience. The formulation to represent the population density served 
by demand node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 is shown in Eq. (3). 
𝑃𝑖
𝑘 =
population of the service area served by demand node 𝑖
total population of all service areas




3.1.3. Optimization Model 
The complete version of our proposed optimization model with the focus of two objective 
functions to (i) maximize the resilience for a set of interdependent infrastructure networks and (ii) 
minimize the total cost associated with the restoration process is as follows. These two conflicting 
objectives and the constraints defined through the development of our model are explained in a 
more detailed way in this section.  
We measure resilience as a function of unmet demand 𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑘 , for demand node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 in 
network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 through recovery at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, where increase in the slack demand represents the 
loss in the maximum flow due to a disruption as seen in Eq. (4). The loss in demand at demand 
node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is denoted by 𝑄𝑖
𝑘, and ∑ 𝑄𝑖
𝑘
𝑖∈𝑁𝑑
𝑘  measures the total unmet demand 




represents the maximum amount of unmet demand in the infrastructure network, and it is assumed 
network performance cannot exceed its original value after recovery. Further, we introduce the 
importance of demand nodes from a community resilience perspective with parameters 𝑉𝑖
𝑘 and 𝑃𝑖
𝑘 
for demand node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘  in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, representing social vulnerability and population 
density, respectively. Recovery is represented as the difference in the total unmet demand just 











𝑘 )𝑘∈𝐾  denotes the amount of slack restored during the 
restoration process. Reducing the total amount of unmet demand means increasing the flow that 
has been carried through the interdependent infrastructure network, thus increasing the 
performance of the interdependent networks. Hence, improving the effectiveness of the 
infrastructure network and its ability to recover the maximum amount of possible slack through 
the recovery, given the prioritization of the demand nodes according to the social vulnerability 
scores and population densities of the region they represent is accomplished through the restoration 
process, is denoted in the resilience objective in Eq. (4). 

























For the cost objective in Eq. (5), we consider three different cost categories that are 
associated with the restoration process of the system. The flow cost, 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑘 , represents the unitary cost 
of carrying flow through link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 in the system. The varying restoration 
costs, 𝑓𝑛𝑖
𝑘 for node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 and 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑘  for link (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘 denotes the cost associated with the 
available resources and their utilization in the restoration process of disrupted components where 
these costs are proportional to the supply capacity of the nodes and the length of the links in the 
networks. Finally, the disruption cost 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 for node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 quantifies the penalty cost for unmet 
demand due to the disruptive event. Additionally, we assign social vulnerability scores and 






𝑘𝑘∈𝐾  assumes that to recover the exact same amount of slack demand from the 
socially more vulnerable and denser areas, the amount of required economic investments increases 
to meet the same resilience levels when it is compared with socially less vulnerable and less 
populated areas [Cutter et al. 2003]. Hence, minimizing the cost objective of our model also 
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considers the recovery of all demand nodes that are associated with highly vulnerable and more 
populated regions to support the community resilience perspective. 
min ∑ ( ∑ 𝑓𝑛𝑖
𝑘𝑧𝑖
𝑘 + ∑ 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑘 𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑘 + ∑ [ ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗



















𝑘, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑠







= 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘\{𝑁𝑠
𝑘 , 𝑁𝑑






𝑘, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (8) 
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 − 𝑢𝑖𝑗












𝑘 ≤ 0 ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (12) 
𝛽𝑖̅𝑡
?̅? − 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ≤ 0,  ∀ ((𝑖, 𝑘), (𝑖,̅ ?̅?)) ∈ 𝛹, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (13) 
𝑦𝑖𝑗





 ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (14) 
𝑧𝑖





 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (15) 
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡





, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (16) 
𝛽𝑖𝑡















∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑘, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (18) 












= 0, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿






= 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁


















 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (22) 
𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ≥ 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑








𝑘 ∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (25) 
𝑧𝑖
𝑘 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (26) 
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 ∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (27) 
𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ∈ {0,1},  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (28) 
𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘𝑟 ∈ {0,1}, ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑘 (29) 
𝛾𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑟 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑘 (30) 
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The first set of constraints, Eqs. (6)-(8), govern the flow conservation of node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘. 
Constraints (9)-(12) control the capacity of disrupted and undisrupted components, where Eq. (9) 
considers undisrupted links, Eqs. (10) and (11) consider the disrupted nodes, and Eq. (12) 
considers disrupted links. Constraint (13) governs the physical interdependency between nodes to 
ensure that node 𝑖̅ ∈ 𝑁?̅? in network ?̅? ∈ 𝐾 is operational at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 only if the node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘  in 
network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is also operational at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇. Constraints (14)-(22) represent the assignment 
scheduling for the restoration process of disrupted components, where Eqs. (14) and (15) ensure 
the work crew assignment for the disrupted components if their restoration is a must, Eqs. (16) and 
(17) ensure the operability of a component when its restoration is completed by the specifically 
assigned work crew 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑘, Eq. (18) ensures that a single work crew can restore at most one 
disrupted component (either a link or a node) in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 at a specific time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, and Eqs. 
(19)-(22) ensure that for a disrupted component to be functional, its restoration should be 
completed by the assigned work crew. Finally, constraints (103)-(30) indicate the nature of 
decision variables in the optimization model. 
3.2. Resilience-Driven Component Importance Measure 
3.2.1. Notation and Assumptions 
In the multi-objective mixed-integer programming model that is extended for integrating 
the resilience-driven CIM with the interdependent infrastructure network restoration problem, the 
same assumptions and model notation hold with the previously discussed optimization model. 
Differently, the weight of each critical infrastructure network is represented by 𝑤𝑘 for network 
𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 where ∑ 𝑤𝑘 = 1𝑘∈𝐾  in this part of the research. 
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3.2.2. Social Vulnerability Measures 
The community resilience perspective is introduced into the interdependent infrastructure 
network restoration model that is integrated with the resilience-driven component importance 
measure, by defining a parameter, 𝑆𝑜𝑉𝐼𝑖𝑐
𝑘  for each demand node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 for 
social vulnerability variable 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶, where this parameter represents an index between 0 and 1. The 
value of 𝑆𝑜𝑉𝐼𝑖𝑐
𝑘  is calculated separately for social vulnerability variable 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 according to the 
SoVI-Lite algorithm [Cutter et al. 2013, Evans et al. 2014] with the same steps in previously 
explained community resilience part of this research. The only difference is that the z-scores of 
the multiple social vulnerability variables is not summed since the social vulnerability indices are 
calculated separately for each social vulnerability variable 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶. The standardization of the social 
vulnerability indices as in Eq. (1) is applied on each social vulnerability variable separately. 
Additionally, the exponential formulation for each social vulnerability variable index is adopted 





, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 , 𝑎 ∈ 𝑍+ (3112) 
  3.2.3. Optimization Model 
The extended optimization model that considers social equity and resilience-driven CIM 
contains three objective functions: (i) to maximize the resilience of the set of interdependent 
infrastructure networks, (ii) to minimize the total cost associated with the restoration of these 
critical infrastructure networks, and (iii) to plan the recovery schedule of the disrupted 
communities according to the vertical social equity distribution among them. The resilience 
maximization and total cost minimization objectives are same as the previously discussed multi-
objective resilience-driven mixed-integer interdependent infrastructure network restoration model. 
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The only difference is that the social vulnerability scores are included separately for each social 
vulnerability variable for both resilience maximization and total cost minimization objectives as 
in Eq. (32) and Eq. (3313), respectively. 
 





𝑘) − ∑ (𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑘 𝑉𝑖
𝑘𝑃𝑖
𝑘)𝑖∈𝑁𝑑𝑘𝑖∈𝑁𝑑𝑘 ] − (𝑡 − 1)[∑ (𝑄𝑖
𝑘𝑉𝑖
𝑘𝑃𝑖














min ∑ ( ∑ 𝑓𝑛𝑖
𝑘𝑧𝑖
𝑘 + ∑ 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑗
𝑘 𝑦𝑖𝑗
𝑘 + ∑ [ ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑗














To account for social equity, we incorporate both horizontal and vertical equity concepts 
for network restoration planning. Horizontal equity is introduced in the first two objectives by 
ensuring that demand of all disrupted communities is met in the system. To account for vertical 
equity, a third objective is formulated to guide the restoration process to start with more heavily 
disrupted communities. To achieve this, the resilience of each demand node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑑
𝑘 at each time 𝑡 








, and the resilience residual of each demand node is 
measured by subtracting the demand node resilience at time t from the optimal resilience level of 
1. Then the total system residual through the duration of complete restoration is minimized. 
Additionally, to emphasize more heavily on the vertical equity, the demand node residual at each 
time 𝑡 is weighted with social vulnerability score, 𝑉𝑖𝑐
𝑘, and population density, 𝑃𝑖
𝑘, of the effected 
community. The social equity-motivated objective is formulated in Eq. (14).    
min ∑ ( ∑ ((1 −
𝑡(𝑄𝑖
𝑘 − 𝑠𝑖𝑡















The complete optimization model is same as the previously discussed one where to provide 
the horizontal equity in the system, the following two constraints are added to the model. Eqs. 
(3515) and (3616) ensure that all disrupted components would be restored hence, the unmet 












= 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (3616) 
3.2.4. Component Importance Measure 
A resilience-based component importance measure, Optimal Recovery Time (ORT), an 
extension (to multiple interdependent infrastructure networks) of a CIM introduced by Fang et al. 
[2016] is utilized. ORT is defined as the optimal time to recover a disrupted component such that 
the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure networks is maximized over the recovery time 
horizon [Almoghathawi et al. 2017]. The ORT measure prioritizes the disrupted components, both 
the nodes and links, with the higher impact on the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks and schedules the restoration process accordingly. With this CIM, decision makers can 
rank the disrupted components according to their latest restoration completion time through the 
available restoration duration. The earlier the disrupted component is scheduled for restoration, a 
higher importance is assigned to it, and thus, the critical components of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks would be scheduled for restoration, since they have a higher impact on the 
resilience of the networks. The formal definition and the mathematical formulation of the ORT 
component importance measure is located below.  
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The ORT of a disrupted component 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸′𝑘 = 𝑁′𝑘 ∪ 𝐿′𝑘 in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 is represented 
as 𝐼𝑒
𝑂𝑅𝑇, as shown in Eqs. (3717) and (3818). In the formulation, 𝜇𝑒𝑡
𝑘  denotes the operability status 
of component 𝜇𝑒𝑡
𝑘  in network 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇. If  𝜇𝑒𝑡
𝑘  is equal to 1, then the disrupted 
component is operational at time 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 and 0 otherwise. 
𝐼𝑒









𝑘 ,           if 𝑒 is a node, 𝑒 = 𝑖       
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡





3.2.5. Multi-criteria Decision Analysis Technique for Aggregated Ranking 
Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) techniques are particularly useful for aiding in 
selecting from one of several discrete alternatives when several criteria are being considered 
[Lootsma 1999]. In this study, we utilize the Technique for Order Preferences by Similarity to an 
Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), which ranks alternatives that balance closeness to the best solution and 
distance from the worst [Hwang and Yoon 1981]. Sets 𝐴 = {𝐴𝑒|𝑒 = 1, … , 𝑛} and 𝐶 =
{𝐶𝑐|𝑐 = 1, … , 𝑚} denote respectively the set of possible alternatives and criteria, respectively. 
Additionally, 𝑌 = {𝑦𝑒𝑐|𝑒 = 1, … , 𝑛; 𝑐 = 1, … , 𝑚} denotes the set of performance scores of the 
alternatives for each criterion. Finally, 𝜔 = {𝜔𝑐|𝑐 = 1, … , 𝑚} denotes the set of criteria weights, 
where 𝜔𝑐 ≥ 0 and ∑ 𝜔𝑐 = 1
𝑚
𝑐=1  such that larger value of 𝜔𝑐 suggests that criterion 𝑐 is more 
important to the decision maker. Eq. (3919) is defined to scale the performance scores of the 
alternatives, as often criteria are measured on different scales. Eq. (40) represents how the criteria 






, 𝑒 = 1, … , 𝑛;       𝑐 = 1, … , 𝑚 (3919) 
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𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝑦) = 𝜔𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑐(𝑦), 𝑒 = 1, … , 𝑛;    𝑐 = 1, … , 𝑚 (40) 
In the next step, the positive ideal solution, 𝐴+, and the negative ideal solution, 𝐴−, are 
determined by the collection of most preferred and the least preferred weighted and scaled 
aggregation score, 𝑣𝑒𝑐, for each criterion, respectively. Eqs. (4120) and (421) represent the formula 
for finding the PIS and NIS respectively, where 𝐶+ represents the set of benefit criteria and 𝐶− 
represents the cost criteria.  
 
𝐴+ = {𝑣1
+(𝑦), … , 𝑣𝑚
+(𝑦)} = {( max
𝑙≤𝑒≤𝑛
𝑣𝑒𝐶(𝑦) |𝑐 ∈ 𝐶
+) , ( min
𝑙≤𝑒≤𝑛
𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝑦) |𝑐 ∈ 𝐶
−)} (4120) 
𝐴− = {𝑣1
−(𝑦), … , 𝑣𝑚
−(𝑦)} = {( min
𝑙≤𝑒≤𝑛
𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝑦) |𝑐 ∈ 𝐶
+) , ( max
𝑙≤𝑒≤𝑛
𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝑦) |𝑐 ∈ 𝐶
−)} (421) 
 
Next, the distance, 𝐷𝑒
+, between alternative 𝐴𝑒 and the positive ideal solution is calculated 
with Euclidean distance in Eq. (40). Similarly, the distance, 𝐷𝑒
−, between the same alternative, 𝐴𝑒 
and the negative ideal solution is found in Eq. (4120). Finally, the balance between positive and 
negative ideal solutions is calculated with Eq. (421), where higher 𝑆𝑒
+values suggest a higher 
similarity to the positive ideal solution. A ranking of alternatives could be produced from an 
ordering of highest to lowest 𝑆𝑒
+ values.  
 
𝐷𝑒




, 𝑒 = 1, … , 𝑛 (43) 
𝐷𝑒
− = √∑ [𝑣𝑒𝑐(𝑦) − 𝑣𝑐−(𝑦)]2
𝑚
𝑐=1











In this study, the set of alternatives, 𝐴, are the disrupted components of the critical 
infrastructure networks and the set of criteria, 𝐶, are the multiple social vulnerability variables. 
The performance scores of the alternatives over each criteria, 𝑣𝑒𝑐, are the rank of the disrupted 
components in the restoration schedule of interdependent infrastructure networks that are based on 
each social vulnerability variable independently.   
Chapter 4: Illustrative Example 
4.1. Interdependent Infrastructure Network Restoration 
The community resilience-driven interdependent infrastructure network restoration model 
is applied with data describing interdependent networks in Shelby County, Tennessee, whose 
location in the New Madrid Seismic Zone makes it susceptible to earthquake risk [González et al. 
2016]. We consider three interdependent infrastructure networks: water, natural gas, and electric 
power distribution systems. Figure 3 depicts the geographical layout of the infrastructure networks 
independently and with the consideration of their physical interdependency. The interdependent 
infrastructure networks consist of a total of 125 nodes including 15 demand nodes in the water 
network, 13 demand nodes in the gas network, and 9 demand nodes in the power network. There 








Figure 3. Critical (a) water, (b) gas, and (c) power infrastructure networks of Shelby 
County, TN and (d) their physical interdependencies respectively (adapted from 
González et al. [2016]). 
4.1.1. Social Vulnerability in Shelby County, TN 
The SoVI-Lite algorithm [Cutter et al. 2013, Evans et al. 2014] is adapted to calculate the 
social vulnerability indices of the demand nodes from the critical infrastructure networks in 
Shelby County, TN. Most of the 11 factor groups in Table 1 are addressed by the available 14 
socio-economic variables listed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Percentage based district-level social vulnerability variables available in Shelby 
County, TN data for the SoVI-Lite algorithm. 
Households earning under $75,000 annually Population that is Asian 
Population under the age of 5 Single-female households 
Households living below the poverty line Population without a high school education 
Households requiring food stamps 
Population working in low-skilled service 
jobs 
Population over the age of 65 Population that is unemployed 
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Population that is Hispanic 
Population speaking English as a second 
language 
Population that is African-American Population that is female 
 
An initial study by Barker et al. [2018] explored the 14 variables for five different 
geographical districts in Shelby County. Figure 4 illustrates the correlation among these 14 
variables that are listed in Table 2, calculated using the Pearson correlation coefficient. Figure 4 
suggests that among these 14 variables, the intersection of with a high positive correlation (Pearson 
correlation coefficient 𝑟 ≥ 0.85) is visualized with dark blue. As the positive correlation 
decreases, the dark blue color becomes lighter. For example, the variable “75000” which stands 
for the percentage of household that earns less than $75,000 annually has a high positive 
correlation (𝑟 ≥ 0.85) with the variable “African-American,” “Single Female,” “No Diploma,” 
“Food Stamp,” “Poverty,” and “Unemployed,” where these variables stand for the percentage of 
the population that is African-American, percentage of single-female households in the society 
where the existence of spouse is missing, percentage of the population that did not graduate from 
high-school, percentage of the households that requires social security relief such as food stamps, 
percentage of the households that lives under the poverty line, and percentage of the population 
that is unemployed, respectively. On the contrary, the intersection of the variables that have a high 
negative correlation, where the Pearson correlation coefficient is below a certain value 
(𝑟 ≤ −0.85), is shaded with dark red and as the negative correlation decreases, the dark red color 
becomes lighter. As an example, the variable “Asian,” which represents the percentage of 
population that is Asian, has a high negative correlation (𝑟 ≤ −0.85) with the previously 
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explained variables “African-American,” “Single Female,” “No Diploma,” “Food Stamp,” 
“Poverty,” and “Unemployed.” 
 
Figure 4. An illustration of the correlation analysis between the 14 social vulnerability 
variables available for the district level in Shelby County, TN, where darker red color and 
bigger circle size represent a higher negative correlation and darker blue color and bigger 
circle size represent a higher positive correlation. 
In this research, to provide a higher level of granularity for social vulnerability in Shelby 
County, SoVI-Lite indices are calculated at the block group level rather than the district level. A 
block group is a statistical division of census tracts that consists of clusters of blocks and generally 
contain between 600 and 3,000 people who are the residents of the covered contiguous area [U.S. 
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Census Bureau 2010]. There are 621 block groups making up Shelby County, which consists in a 
total of 928,794 residents. These numbers are the exact values that are utilized through the social 
vulnerability calculations with respect to the availability of data where around 10 block groups 
that contain around 4,000 citizens are eliminated because of the missingness of certain required 
demographics. However, not all 14 variables are available at the block group level either. Figure 
5 highlights the correlation among the eight variables available in the block group level of Shelby 
County, and it appears that all of the existing variables have a lower positive and negative 
correlation between each other when compared with the district level data. However, in the block 
group level data, none of the two-variable combinations have a high correlation (neither positive 
nor negative) behavior especially when the correlation measures in the district level are considered. 
In the block group level, the highest positive correlation is between the variable “75000,” and the 
variables “African-American,” “Single Female,” and “Poverty,” but the Pearson correlation 
coefficient has a lower value (𝑟 ≤ 0.6). The definition of these variables is exactly the same with 
the district level variables. On the other hand, in the block group level data, none of the variable 
pairs end up with a Pearson correlation coefficient value that is below a certain value (𝑟 ≤ −0.6), 




Figure 5. An illustration of the correlation analysis with the available social vulnerability 
variables in the block group level in Shelby County, TN, where darker red color and bigger 
circle size represent a higher negative correlation and darker blue color and bigger circle 
size represent a higher positive correlation. 
As such, for the block group data, all the existing variables are included in the social 
vulnerability calculations. Additionally, as some variables that exist in the district level data but 
not in the block group level data are also covered by the above analysis. For example, in the district 
level data, the variable “75000” and “African-American” have highly positive correlation with the 
variables “No Diploma,” “Food Stamp,” and “Unemployment,”. As such, the existence of these 
two variables in the block group data provides insight into the three missing variables and 
complements the information provided with only two variables. Thus, to not lose any information, 
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the set of all eight variables are considered in this study, as enumerated in Table 3. The SoVI-Lite 
calculations are based on these eight variables which contain neither high positive nor high 
negative correlation.  
Table 3. The percentage based social vulnerability variables that are utilized through the 
SoVI-Lite algorithm for the block group level in Shelby County, TN. 
Households earning under $75,000 annually Population that is Hispanic 
Population over the age of 65 Population that is African-American 
Population that is Asian Single-female based households 
Population under the age of 5 Households that are in poverty 
 
To assign social vulnerability scores, 𝑉𝑖
𝑘, and population densities, 𝑃𝑖
𝑘, to demand nodes 
at the block level, specific geographical regions were identified to represent each demand node. 
To estimate the geographical region that each demand node covers, Voronoi diagrams [Okabe et 
al. 2008] are utilized. In essence, the Voronoi diagram method can be summarized as follows: for 
a given finite set of points {𝑝1, … , 𝑝𝑛} in the Euclidean plane, 𝑋, the Voronoi cell 𝑉𝑜𝑟𝑘 contains 
the point 𝑝𝑘 and all the other points whose distance to 𝑝𝑘, 𝑑(𝑝𝑥, 𝑝𝑘), is less than their distance to 
any other point, 𝑝𝑗, 𝑑(𝑝𝑥 , 𝑝𝑗). The more formal and general definition is formulated in Eq. (46).  
𝑉𝑜𝑟𝑖 = {𝑝 | 𝑑(𝑝, 𝑝𝑖) ≤ 𝑑(𝑝, 𝑝𝑗)}, ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 (46) 
In this study, each demand node from all three infrastructure networks in Shelby County is 
considered as the Voronoi seeds and the coverage areas of the demand nodes are represented by 
the Voronoi cells in which they are located. These Voronoi cells, along with their associated block 
groups, are represented in Figure 6Error! Reference source not found.. The social vulnerability 
indices of all the block groups that are either fully or partially included in the single Voronoi cell 
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are assigned to the demand node that is considered as the seed of the region. The population 
densities are however assigned proportionally to the demand nodes according their portion that is 
included in each Voronoi region (i.e., for a block group that is divided into two by the border of 
two neighbor cells, its social vulnerability index is assigned to both demand nodes, but its 
population is divided into two and assigned proportionally to each demand node separately). 
 
Figure 6. An illustration of the distribution of block groups into Voronoi cells that are 
created by the demand nodes of three critical infrastructure networks in Shelby County, 
TN. 
The social vulnerability indices of the demand nodes are calculated by taking the average 
of the social vulnerability indices of the included block groups in the same Voronoi cell. Figure 7 
represents the social vulnerability indices, 𝑆𝑜𝑉𝐼𝑖
𝑘, of all the demand nodes in critical infrastructure 
networks of Shelby County. Figure 8 illustrates the exponential representation of the social 
vulnerability scores, 𝑉𝑖
𝑘, that are included in the optimization model to give relatively higher 
importance to the demand nodes in more vulnerable areas. For example, according to these figures, 
demand nodes 32, 5, 8, 3 and 11 represent areas that may require prior and more resources to 




𝑘, of the demand nodes in Shelby County to illustrate which demand nodes 
serve socially more vulnerable areas. The block groups that are colored white represent a lack of 
household information or a lack of residents. 
 
Figure 7. Illustration of social vulnerability indices, 𝑺𝒐𝑽𝑰𝒊




Figure 8. Illustration of the exponential social vulnerability scores, 𝑽𝒊
𝒌. 
 
Figure 9. Representation of the exponential social vulnerability scores, 𝑽𝒊
𝒌, of the demand 




The multi-objective problem is solved using the -constraint approach [Chankong and 
Haimes 2008], where the resilience objective is converted into a constraint and assigned with the 
values between 0 and 1 such as ∈ [0,1] as in Eq. (3313). 
























≤  (47) 
4.1.2. Disruption and Restoration 
The disruption scenarios each representing a different earthquake magnitude (𝑀𝑤 =
6,  𝑀𝑤 = 7,  𝑀𝑤 = 8,  𝑀𝑤 = 9) are implemented. The highest earthquake magnitude (𝑀𝑤 = 9) 
results in a total of 43 disrupted components, 19 of which are demand nodes. For the restoration 
process, two work crews are assigned to each infrastructure network. A time horizon of 28 periods 
is considered to complete the recovery for all four earthquake scenarios. 
Among the four disruption scenarios, the two with higher earthquake magnitudes 
(𝑀𝑤 = 8, 𝑀𝑤 = 9) represent significant differences in the optimal restoration schedules between 
the inclusion and exclusion of social vulnerability and population density measures. The other two 
earthquake scenarios with lower magnitudes (𝑀𝑤 = 6, 𝑀𝑤 = 7) contain few disrupted 
components and a low amount of unmet demand, therefore the inclusion of social and population 
measures does not result in a significant difference in restoration scheduling 
As such, the focus of the analysis on the 𝑀𝑤 = 8 and 𝑀𝑤 = 9 disruption scenarios, and it 
represents the effect of including social vulnerability and population density measures by the 
change in the restoration order of disrupted nodes. Figure 10 through Figure 12 illustrate the 
change in order for 𝑀𝑤 = 8 scenarios for water, gas, and power networks, respectively, and 
likewise Figure 13 through Figure 15 for 𝑀𝑤 = 9 scenarios. The change in the importance of 
components is measured as follows: (i) the optimal restoration schedules are obtained for two 
separate cases: including and excluding social vulnerability and population, (ii) the restoration 
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order of the disrupted components is listed for each network, and (iii) the difference in orders for 
each component is calculated with and without social vulnerability and population measures. If 
this difference is zero, then this means that the restoration order of this component is the same in 
both cases, suggesting the importance of this component did not change between the two 
approaches. However, a positive difference suggests that the restoration of the component is 
scheduled earlier when social vulnerability and population density of its service area is taken into 
account, suggesting that such measures make the component a priority. Lighter shades represent 
components with less importance when the social vulnerability and population measures are 
considered. Note that the darkest shaded components might not necessarily be the most important 
component in the restoration scheduling, but it is the component that has the biggest change in its 
restoration order, thus the biggest change in its importance when additional measures are included 
in the optimization model. While only demand nodes are considered for weighting with social and 
population measures, naturally supply and transshipment nodes are important to meeting demand 






















Figure 10. The change in the importance of the disrupted supply, transshipment, and 
demand nodes in the water network when the community perspective is considered with 
the earthquake magnitude 𝑴𝒘 = 𝟖, where lighter blue represents higher negative change 










Figure 11. The change in the importance of the disrupted supply, transshipment, and 
demand nodes in the gas network when the community perspective is considered with the 
earthquake magnitude 𝑴𝒘 = 𝟖, where lighter green represents higher negative change and 




























Figure 12. The change in the importance of the disrupted supply, transshipment, and 
demand nodes in the power network when the community perspective is considered with 
the earthquake magnitude 𝑴𝒘 = 𝟖, where lighter orange represents higher negative 






























Figure 13. The change in the importance of the disrupted supply, transshipment, and 
demand nodes in the water network when the community perspective is considered with 
the earthquake magnitude 𝑴𝒘 = 𝟗, where lighter blue represents higher negative change 



















Figure 14. The change in the importance of the disrupted supply, transshipment, and 
demand nodes in the gas network when the community perspective is considered with the 
earthquake magnitude 𝑴𝒘 = 𝟗, where lighter green represents higher negative change and 
































Figure 15. The change in the importance of the disrupted supply, transshipment, and 
demand nodes in the power network when the community perspective is considered with 
the earthquake magnitude 𝑴𝒘 = 𝟗, where lighter orange represents higher negative 
change and darker orange represents higher positive change. 
The trajectory of the system performance over time is illustrated by the unmet demand 
change in Figure 16 to compare the effect on restoration when social vulnerability and population 
density are accounted for in the analysis. As it can be seen from these three plots, the unmet 
demand over time varies for each network when community resilience measures are taken into 








Figure 16. Illustration of unmet demand over the recovery time (a) without SoVI, (b) with 
SoVI, and (c) comparison on the same plot where dashed lines represent the consideration 
and solid lines represent the inconsideration of social vulnerability and population density. 
Finally, to validate the differences between the optimal restoration schedules (without 
SoVI, with SoVI) for the critical infrastructure networks in Shelby County, and to highlight the 
contribution of the proposed study, we formulated a model to minimize the sum of differences in 
the restoration times of each disrupted component between the without SoVI and with SoVI 
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models. At the end, this study did not find a zero distance result, suggesting that there is not one 
restoration schedule that is optimal for both models. Therefore, it can be concluded that accounting 
for social vulnerability in restoration schedule indeed changes the optimal scheduling and 
assignment solution.  
4.2. Resilience-Driven Component Importance Measure 
In this part of the research, two physically interdependent infrastructure networks, water 
distribution and electric power networks, the geographic layout of which is represented in Figure 
17, both independently and combined are considered. The two infrastructure networks contain a 
total of 108 nodes, including 15 demand nodes in the water network and 9 demand nodes in the 
power network. From both of these interdependent infrastructure networks, there are a total of 288 







Figure 17. The geographic layout of power and water distribution systems in Shelby 
County, TN independently and interdependently, respectively (adapted from González et 
al. [2016]). 
4.2.1. Social Vulnerability Variables 
The social vulnerability measures included in the SoVI algorithm [Cutter et al. 2003] were 
collected for Shelby County, TN. Most of the 11 social vulnerability factors in Table 1 are 
accounted for with the eight social vulnerability variables listed in Table 4. The provided social 
vulnerability variables are determined similarly with the community resilience part of the previous 




Table 4. The complete final list of the social vulnerability variables that are utilized in the 
community-resilience study of Shelby County, TN which are defined by Cutter et al. [2003] 
as the percentages. 
Population over the age of 65 Single-female based households 
Population under the age of 5 Households that are in poverty 
Population that is Hispanic  
   
Similarly, with the previous study, the social vulnerability scores, 𝑉𝑖𝑐
𝑘, are assigned to the 
demand nodes at the block group level by utilizing Voronoi diagram approach. The estimated 
Voronoi coverage areas for each demand node in the two critical infrastructure networks appear 
as the dark boundaries in Figure 18 and they lay on top of the block groups. The shading of the 
block groups indicates the strength of social vulnerability index, 𝑆𝑜𝑉𝐼𝑖𝑐
𝑘 , for each of the five 
variables, which are encoded as “65+,” “5-,” “Hispanic,” “Single-Female,” and “Poverty.” To 
assign the associated social vulnerability indices to the demand nodes, the average of the indices 
of the block groups that are located in the Voronoi coverage area is taken and assigned to each 
demand node. Additionally, we also assign the associated population density values to demand 
nodes based on the proportional population density of each Voronoi coverage area. 
 




                                        (c)                                                                            (d) 
 
 (e)  
 
Figure 18. The distribution of social vulnerability scores over the block groups in Shelby 
County, TN based on the population that is (a) under age five, (b) over age sixty-five, (c) 
Hispanic, (d) living in poverty, and (e) living in a single-female household whereas with the 
darker shades, socially more vulnerable region is represented. 
For variable 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶, the value of 𝑉𝑖𝑐
𝑘 is scaled between zero and one, and the social 
vulnerability scores are grouped in the following four intervals: 0-0.25, 0.25-0.5, 0.5-0.75 and 
0.75-1, ranging from the least socially vulnerable to the most socially vulnerable region. The 
darker the map shading, the higher the social vulnerability is illustrated. As illustrated in Figure 
18, some block groups are especially vulnerable with respect to some variables and not with others, 




To solve the multi-objective interdependent infrastructure network restoration problem, we 
utilize the ε-constraint approach [Chankong and Haimes 2008]. Maximizing social equity is kept 
as the objective of the model, and the resilience maximization objective is converted into a 
constraint, shown in Eq.(421), as the resilience measure naturally ranges from 0 to 1. Also, 
minimizing the total cost associated with the restoration process objective is converted into a 
budget constraint as in Eq. (421), where the budget limit, 𝐷, is determined by the decision maker. 
























≤   (48) 
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𝑘𝑧𝑖
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≤ 𝐷 (49) 
4.2.3. Disruption Scenarios 
In this study, we consider a single disruption scenario of a magnitude 7.0 earthquake, 𝑀𝑤 =
7. Were a lone earthquake scenario considered, the number of disrupted components would be 
fixed and the resulting rankings would be specific just to that particular disruption. To capture a 
more holistic ranking of (most of) the components, we simulate 50 different disruptions with 
varying disrupted components. In each one of these 50 different cases, the disrupted components 
are determined according to a previously conducted simulation study by González et al. [2016], 
and a certain disruption probability is assigned to each component to simulate one of the 50 
magnitude 7.0 earthquakes. Across the 50 disruptions, a total of 397 components were disrupted, 
109 of which are nodes and the remaining 288 are links. Among these 109 of the nodes, 49 of them 
belong to the water network and the remaining 60 of them belong to the power network. Among 
the 288 links, 142 belong to the water network and the remaining 146 from the power network. 
The number of disrupted components range from 28 to 60 in the individual disruption scenario 
simulations. In this study, we run the proposed restoration scheduling of interdependent 
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infrastructure network model for 50 disruption scenarios with varying disrupted components. This 
step is repeated five times to reflect the optimal restoration scheduling for each of the five social 
vulnerability variable perspectives. As such, we calculate the ORT for each variable separately, 
where disrupted components with smaller restoration completion time earn higher priority and 
receive smaller rank values. As the restoration completion time of the disrupted components 
increase, their priority decrease and the components are assigned with higher ranking values, thus 
lower importance levels.  
To aggregate the 50 different disruption scenarios, we develop an aggregation index that 
determines the final rank of each disrupted component. This index is calculated with the following: 
(i) the disrupted components in each disruption scenario are ranked separately using ORT, (ii) the 
ranks of each disrupted component are represented with 
𝑖
𝑔
, where 𝑖 refers to the rank of the 
disrupted component and 𝑔 refers to the total number of disrupted components in each scenario, 
such that 𝑔 ∈ [28, 60] [Kolesárová et al. 2007], and finally (iii) the 
𝑖
𝑔
 values are averaged based 
on the number of scenarios that each component is disrupted [Muralidharan et al. 2002, Ho et al. 
2009]. That is, even though there are a total of 50 disruption scenarios, if a single component is 
disrupted in only a of these scenarios, we calculate the average based on theℎ, where ℎ ≤ 𝑔, 
scenarios such that the randomness of the simulation does not influence a component’s ranking. 
The aggregation index applies simple arithmetic on the ordinal data, however this practice is 
motivated by the literature [Kolesárová et al. 2007, Muralidharan et al. 2003, Ho et al. 2009].  
4.2.4. Integration of Rankings with TOPSIS 
Discussed previously, different network components are important from different social 
vulnerability perspectives. To aggregate these different perspectives into a comprehensive ranking 
of infrastructure components that affect community resilience, we implement a multi-criteria 
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decision analysis technique, TOPSIS. Recall that with TOPSIS, the set of alternatives, 𝐴, is ranked 
across multiple criteria, 𝐶. With the application of TOPSIS in our study, the alternatives to be 
ranked consist of the set of 397 disrupted components, and the multiple criteria consist of the set 
of the five social vulnerability variables. The performance scores of the set of alternatives under 
each criteria, 𝑌𝑒𝑐, represents the aggregation index of the ranks of the disrupted components whose 
values range from [0.017,1].  The five social vulnerability variables represent “costs” (e.g., values 
to be minimized) from an MCDA perspective. And since a better ranking is the result of a smaller 
aggregation index, the positive ideal solution for each variable is its smallest aggregation index. 
To find the weights of each social vulnerability variable, 𝜔𝑐, we utilize the Principle 
Component Analysis (PCA) technique, a widely used approach to aggregate multiple inputs with 
the minimum loss of information [Adler and Golany 2000]. The PCA method explains the variance 
structure of data through linear combinations of variables [Johnson and Wichern 1982], where the 
dynamics of the information exist along directions with the largest variance [Shlens 2014]. Hence, 
it is not uncommon to use the “percent variation in a dependent variable explained by an 
independent variable” to measure the importance of the effect of the independent one on the 
dependent one [Rosenthal and Rubin 1979]. Similarly, we assume that the amount of variance that 
is captured by each social vulnerability variable could stand for the importance of that variable 
relative to the others. More information about the formulation and definition of the PCA approach 
can be found in Holland [2008]. 
To ensure that the weight, the largest variance coverage stands for the most important 
variable, is consistent with the previous steps of our study where a lower ranking value represents 
more a more important component, we apply the following scaling approach: (i) calculate the 
inverse of the original weight of each social vulnerability variable found from PCA, (ii) sum these 
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inverse values, and (iii) scale them with the ratio of each over their sum. As such, the newly 
calculated weight values are consistent with the ranking of the components based on their 
importance (i.e., higher weight values suggest less important social vulnerability variable) and 
have a sum that is equal to 1. The explained scaling approach with the final criteria weights, 𝜔𝑐
′′ is 
formulated in Eq. (50)-(52) where ∑ 𝜔𝑐
′′ = 1𝑚𝑐=1 , and the calculated final weights of the five social 





 , 𝑐 = 1, … , 𝑚 (50)  
𝑆 = ∑ 𝜔𝑐
′
𝑐






 , 𝑐 = 1, … , 𝑚  (52)  
Table 5. The representation of the weights of the social vulnerability variables that are determined by PCA 
method and utilized in TOPSIS algorithm. 
Population that is over the age 65 0.22 
Population that is under the age 5 0.22 
Population that is Hispanic 0.23 
Single-female parent based households 0.17 
Households living under the poverty line 0.16 
 
Table 5 suggests that the weights that are assigned to each social vulnerability variable are 
relatively similar. Despite the PCA weights of social vulnerability variables being close to each 
other, a systematic and data-driven approach was used, allowing for a better informed decision 
making process relative to random (or strictly equal) weights.  
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4.2.5. Critical Components of Shelby County, TN 
The components that make up the top 10 rankings for each social vulnerability variable are 
depicted in Figure 20 and Figure 19 for the water and power networks, respectively. For the power 
network, we see some variability in ranking among the components for the different social 
vulnerability variables (e.g., most of the top five components have very similar ranks for each 
variable), perhaps suggesting that social vulnerability does have a little impact restoration order 
for that network. The water network, however, demonstrates more variability: there is a wider 
variety of components and different types of components (i.e., both links and nodes) in the top ten. 
In both networks, the most important component according to ORT stands out across social 
vulnerability variables. Note that of the 32 components that appear across the top 10 rankings of 
the two networks, only two of them are links, and as the component rankings are aggregated based 
on a multi-criteria decision analysis technique, the top ten components result as all nodes. The 





Figure 19. The ranking of the subset of power network components (both nodes and links 
are listed) are represented independently based on each social vulnerability variable. 
Figure 20. The ranking of the subset of the water network components (both nodes and 
links are listed) are represented independently based on each social vulnerability variable. 
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Integrating the rankings with TOPSIS results in Table 6. The integrated rankings are quite 
similar to Figure 20 and Figure 19 due in part to the lack of variability in the individual rankings 
of many of the social vulnerability variables and due to the similarity of variable weights from 
Table 5. As it can be seen, the water network has relatively higher variance than power network in 
terms of the ranking of the critical components under different social vulnerability measures. This 
could be due to the difference in size and connectivity of the two networks.  
Table 6. A subset of the critical components (both nodes and links are considered) in the 
water and power network based on all the available social vulnerability measures together. 
Rank by ORT Water network components Power network components 
1 Node 20 Node 27 
2 Node 25 Node 33 
3 Node 15 Node 32 
4 Node 3 Node 2 
5 Node 5 Node 12 
6 Node 45 Node 7 
7 Node 8 Node 3 
8 Node 4 Node 19 
9 Node 18 Node 6 





Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks 
Due to the globalization of networks and the developments in the infrastructure technology, 
interdependencies among critical infrastructure networks are being formed incrementally. Such 
enhanced interdependencies result in more complex and vulnerable systems, where it becomes 
more challenging for the decision makers to plan their recovery after a disruptive event. 
Additionally, the dependency of the surrounding communities over these networks and their social 
vulnerabilities increase the possible impacts of the disruptive events, by hardening the problem of 
recovery planning both for the system and the society.  
In this research, the interdependent infrastructure network restoration problem is studied 
and an optimization model from the community resilience perspective is proposed. The proposed 
model plans the restoration schedule for each network by (i) prioritizing the disrupted components, 
and (ii) assigning them to available work crews for specific time periods according to their relative 
importance on the overall system resilience. The aim of prioritizing the disrupted components and 
enhancing the resilience of physically interdependent infrastructure networks consider the 
community resilience perspective through the restoration scheduling process as each demand node 
is assigned with the (i) social vulnerability score and the (ii) population density of the residential 
area they represent. 
Furthermore, understanding the relationship between the certain socio-economic 
characteristics and the different components of the networks is the first step to identifying 
component criticality. The interdependent infrastructure networks restoration problem and the 
identification of critical components in the system is studied where a multi-objective optimization 
model from the community resilience perspective that (i) maximizes the overall system resilience 
for a given restoration horizon, (ii) minimizes the total cost associated with the restoration process, 
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and (iii) maximizes the social equity through the scheduling of restoration process is proposed. 
The proposed model plans for the restoration schedule of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks by prioritizing the disrupted components that serve socially less advantageous 
communities based on their social demographics and resilience levels. This approach ensures that 
the restoration process of the interdependent infrastructure networks is motivated by social equity 
and community resilience perspectives.  
Additionally, the proposed model considers various social vulnerability measures where 
each demand node in the critical networks are assigned with (i) a specific social vulnerability score 
for each social vulnerability variable separately, and (ii) population density of its related service 
area in order to represent the service expectations from community perspective. In this study, the 
proposed approach allows us to determine the critical infrastructure components according to the 
planned restoration schedule with the utilization of resilience-based component importance 
measure, ORT. The critical components are ranked according to their restoration time due based 
on multiple social vulnerability measures. For the results of this study, it is observed that through 
the restoration of two critical infrastructures in Shelby County, the majority of the earlier periods 
of the restoration horizon are reserved for the nodes of the networks as they are responsible for 
more drastic increase in the system resilience both for the case of considering each social 
vulnerability measure independently and together where they are aggregated by TOPSIS 
algorithm. Hence, through the pre-disruption preparedness planning and the post-disruption 
recovery process, the decision-makers could schedule the restoration of the disrupted nodes prior 
to the disrupted links. For the schedule of the nodes among each other, in that case, the decision 




The social vulnerability scores are calculated with a reduced approach of Social 
Vulnerability Index [Cutter et al. 2003], in order to account for the major social dimensions in the 
community, -such as age, income level, and race attainments. Also, population densities are 
calculated to measure the human occupancy in the surrounding of the network components. These 
community resilience measures are added to a mixed-integer multi-objective resilience-driven 
restoration model, which maximizes the cumulative community resilience of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks over time while considering the total cost associated with the restoration 
process. 
As for the results of the study, it is observed that accounting for the community resilience 
measures in the restoration planning of interdependent infrastructure networks definitely affects 
the scheduling of the disrupted components since there exists no such restoration schedule that is 
optimal for both including and excluding community resilience measures. As expected, disrupted 
components that represent socially more vulnerable and denser regions are prioritized in the 
restoration process. Thus, the components with higher priority correspond to not only the ones 
with large unmet demands in their service area, but also to the ones that are responsible for the 
supply and transshipment of commodities to socially more vulnerable communities.  
For future work, the model could be extended to consider partial disruptions, such that the 
system can operate with reduced capacities. Moreover, partial physical dependencies could be 
included in the proposed model, where a component could be partially functional, if the 
components upon which it depends are partially operational. Additionally, the proposed 
community resilience-based prioritization and scheduling process could be combined with 
geographical hazard metrics to account for spatial risks associated with the specific location of the 
network components. Furthermore, additional resilience-based component importance measures 
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could be considered to determine and rank the critical components of the interdependent 
infrastructure networks. Moreover, more critical infrastructure networks that are interdependent in 
nature could be included in the study with various types of interdependencies, and the community-
resilience perspective could be extended to incorporate with different types of interdependencies 
to provide a more comprehensive study of interdependent infrastructure network restoration and 
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